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Broadcast is used in wireless sensor networks for operations such as software updates, network queries, and command
dissemination. Applications such as battlefield control and natural resource management require not only authentication of
broadcast messages, but also secrecy against eavesdroppers. In this paper we design, implement, and evaluate a novel scheme
that meets the requirements of secrecy, authenticity, integrity, and freshness of broadcast messages in the context of a single-hop
wireless sensor network. Our contributions are three-fold: first, we propose the use of time-varying keys (based on a key-chain)
for broadcast encryption, emphasising advantages such as non-forgeability, protection against old-key compromise, and allowance
for dynamic data. Second, we extend the basic key-chain mechanism to incorporate limited protection against key loss, allowing
legitimate receivers to recover even if they have lost a small number of keys. Third, we prototype our scheme by incorporating it
into Deluge, the network programming protocol distributed with TinyOS, and quantify its cost in terms of time, space, and power
consumption on a TelosB mote platform. Our scheme represents a practical, eﬃcient and scalable means of delivering broadcast
data secretly to a large number of low-power sensor nodes.
1. Introduction
Broadcast is an essential feature in any sensor network for
critical operations such as network query, software updates,
time synchronisation, and network management. Given its
importance, there is growing interest in addressing broadcast
security [1]. Much of the research literature has focused on
authenticity of the broadcast source and data; we refer the
reader to a recent article [2] that summarises the challenges
of broadcast authentication in resource constrained wireless
sensor networks. In this paper, we consider secrecy (also
refered to as confidentiality or privacy) of the broadcast
data. Several critical applications warrant secrecy, such as
command and control signaling in the battlefield. The
application that motivates this paper is a project undertaken
by our organisation, the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), to build a Water
Resources Observation Network (WRON) [3] to assist in
managing and controlling the national water resources of
Australia. CSIRO has developed sensor nodes called Flecks
[4] which are candidates for deployment at sites such as
farms, rivers, lakes, dams, and catchment areas. Secrecy of
various broadcast data and control messages is important in
such a scenario: for example, the sensory parameters (such
as sampling periods and thresholds) that would from time to
time be updated using broadcast mechanisms need to be kept
secret, and software upgrades need to be kept confidential to
prevent exploitation of code weaknesses. This paper develops
mechanisms that operate within the resource constraints of
sensor nodes to ensure secrecy of such broadcast data, while
also guaranteeing authenticity, integrity, and freshness of the
broadcast messages.
Several schemes, for example [5–9], have been proposed
in the literature for broadcast authentication, but to the best
of our knowledge there exists only one other proposal [10]
that can provide secrecy of broadcast data in wireless sensor
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networks. We emphasise that our work was undertaken
independently and concurrently to the work inMiniSec [10],
and our approaches have fundamental diﬀerences. While
MiniSec uses a fixed key (known to all parties) with a time-
varying initialisation vector (IV), our approach uses a time-
varying key (derived from a key-chain). As explained later,
our method, though restricted in this work to single-hop
networks (we have subsequently extended our scheme to
multihop networks), provides authentication which is robust
to key compromise unlike MiniSec. Lastly, we note that
though several of the existing authentication schemes can
be leveraged to incorporate secrecy, they either entail high
storage requirements (e.g., [5]) or are cost-eﬀective only
for bulk data transfers (e.g. [6–9]) but not for sporadic
transmission of broadcast data.
In this work we propose, design, prototype, and evaluate
a practical method for incorporating secrecy, authenticity,
integrity, and replay protection (aka freshness) of broadcast
data in a wireless sensor network. Our work in this paper is
restricted to single-hop networks. There are two reasons for
this.
(i) First, broadcast secrecy is a very challenging problem.
Symmetric encryption based on a static shared
key requires all parties to know the key, which is
problematic since receivers should only be able to
verify but not originate valid broadcasts. Asymmetric
encryption (which does not require all parties to
share a key) is impractical on a per-packet basis due
to high computation and communication overheads.
New solution techniques are required, and to contain
the complexity this paper considers the relatively
simpler scenario of a single-hop network (as we will
soon see solutions for even this restricted scenario
are non-trivial). Our subsequent work in [11, 12]
has extended our solution technique to multihop
networks, with corresponding increase in solution
complexity (discussion of which is beyond the scope
of the current paper).
(ii) Second, single-hop transmission suﬃces in many
application scenarios, particularly in hierarchically
organised networks. For example, in a battlefield
scenario it would not be uncommon for a satellite
or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to directly (i.e.,
single-hop) broadcast command and control mes-
sages to all soldiers in a troop unit. Likewise in a
natural resource monitoring application a mobile
base-station could periodically broadcast a set of
instructions to all sensor devices in a region in a
single-hop fashion. In such networks multihopping
may not even be desirable (for possible reliability
and energy reasons). So there is indeed value in
developing security solutions that apply to such
single-hop networks.
Our novel approach to broadcast secrecy in this paper
uses symmetric encryption but changes the encryption key
on a per-packet basis using the known concept of a “key
chain”, namely, a set of successive keys derived from repeated
one-way hashing of an initial key. For our first contribution
we show how a key chain can be used for encrypting
broadcast messages to ensure secrecy, authenticity, replay
protection (freshness), and highmessage entropy (i.e., cipher
messages do not repeat even if the plain-text messages
do). We also highlight several natural advantages of our
approach, such as the ability to accommodate dynamic data,
as well as protection against compromised keys (we note
that the latter is not available in MiniSec [10]). For our
second contribution we enhance the key-chain-based scheme
to incorporate limited resilience to key losses. With our
method a node that has lost some keys gets a probabilistic
opportunity (that diminishes with the number of lost keys)
to recover the missing keys from the key chain, and the rate
at which this opportunity diminishes can be adjusted system-
wide to balance a node’s recovery ability against an intruder’s
window of opportunity to compromise the key chain. As our
third contribution we prototype our mechanism for secret
broadcasts in the context of the network reprogramming
protocol Deluge included in TinyOS, and present experimen-
tal results which quantify the associated time, space, and
power overheads in a TelosBmote-based single-hop network.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
defines the problem setting, solution requirements, and prior
approaches from the literature. In Section 3 we describe our
solution and discuss its properties, while Section 4 extends
it to allow recovery from key losses. Section 5 describes
our prototype implementation, with experimental results
presented in Section 6, and the paper concludes in Section 7
with pointers to future work.
2. Problem Overview and Prior Solutions
This section defines the operating environment and threat
model, outlines the solution requirements, and discusses
relevant prior work in wireless sensor network broadcast
security.
2.1. Operating Environment and Threat Model. We assume
a single-hop wireless sensor network in which a single
source of broadcast data, called the base station, can directly
communicate with all sensor nodes. Single-hop topologies
arise in applications ranging from battlefield command
and control operations between a command centre (e.g.,
satellite or unmanned aerial vehicle) and deployed soldiers,
to emerging body area networks for continuous health
monitoring [13]. We assume that the base station has
abundant computation and energy resources, and cannot be
compromised.
If the application warrants confidentiality of the broad-
cast data, the sensor nodes are expected to be protected
against physical compromise. The sensor nodes in the
WRON (water resources observation network) initiative
developed at CSIRO are expected either to be physically
inaccessible to attackers (e.g., in secured areas), or hardened
by incorporation of tamper-resistant hardware such as a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [14]. TPMs provide highly
secure storage of cryptographic keys, along with secure
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hash storage for attestation and integrity verification of
platform configuration, ensuring that physically captured
nodes cannot be made to reveal cryptographic keys or
have their software altered without detection. If one or
more nodes in the network are not compromise-resistant,
confidentiality of the broadcasts is unavoidably put at risk,
though authenticity of all broadcasts can still be ensured.
The wireless medium is by nature broadcast and hence a
passive eavesdropper can listen to all transmissions. An active
intruder can transmit arbitrary messages, or replay a valid
captured message at a later time. We make no assumptions
about the number of intruders, their locations, their radio
range, or the degree of collusion amongst them. In the case
where nodes are not hardened against physical compromise,
no assurances on data confidentiality can be given if an
intruder can extract the cryptographic keys. Nevertheless, we
assume it is an operational requirement that authenticity of
the broadcast source and data not be sacrificed even if one
or more sensor nodes are compromised. We assume that the
intruder does not have the capability to block reception of
packets at an uncompromised node; such “jamming” will
allow the intruder to act as an intermediary between the base
station and a receiver, in eﬀect making the network multihop
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, we do not
explicitly address denial-of-service or battery-drain attacks.
2.2. Solution Requirements. We seek a security mechanism
that provides the following properties for broadcast traﬃc in
a single-hop wireless sensor network.
(1) Confidentiality. The broadcast data should be kept
secret from eavesdroppers. As noted earlier, confiden-
tiality cannot be guaranteed if one or more nodes in
the network are physically compromised.
(2) Authenticity. Messages not originating from the base
station should be discarded (ensuring source authen-
ticity), as should messages that have been tampered
with (ensuring data authenticity, also known as mes-
sage integrity). Note again that authenticity should be
guaranteed even if one or more sensor nodes in the
network are compromised.
(3) Freshness. Packets that have been captured and
replayed at a later time should be discarded by the
sensor nodes.
(4) Semantic Security. Even if the broadcast messages
are chosen from a small set, the encryption should
produce ciphertext that does not give information to
an intruder about which of these messages was sent.
(5) Dynamic Data. The scheme should be cost-eﬀective
even when the content of the sequence of broadcast
messages is not known in its entirety before hand
by the base station. For example, the scheme should
be eﬃcient not just for broadcast file transfers (e.g.,
a new code image), but also for short dynamic
broadcast messages (e.g. battlefield commands).
(6) Delay Tolerance. No time synchronisation should be
required in the system.
(7) Incremental Processing. Each received packet must be
immediately verifiable without having to wait for
additional data.
(8) Resilience to Loss. A receiver that loses a small
number of packets should be able to receive and read
subsequent broadcast messages.
In Section 3.2 we will discuss how our proposed scheme
meets the above requirements.
2.3. Prior Proposals. We now briefly summarise existing
schemes for broadcast security in wireless sensor network
that are relevant to the current work.
We are aware of only one existing scheme, MiniSec
[10], that provides for secrecy of broadcast (and indeed
of unicast) messages in wireless sensor networks. MiniSec
broadcast requires the sender and all recipients of the
broadcast to hold a shared key K . Further, time is divided
into “epochs” and all broadcast participants have clocks that
are loosely synchronised to within an epoch. A broadcast
message payload M is appended with a nonce (which
is a combination of the packet counter and the epoch
number), and then encrypted using oﬀset code-book (OCB)
mode [15] of block cipher encryption. OCB encryption
essentially makes the payload and nonce nonseparable in
cipher-text, and a receiver can thus verify authenticity of
the message by checking that the nonce obtained post-
decryption matches the expected counter value. The use of
OCB therefore provides both secrecy and authenticity in
MiniSec. The loose time synchronisation in MiniSec poses
some concerns about replay attacks within an epoch, and
these are addressed via use of Bloom filters to detect and
discard such replayed packets. Though MiniSec operates
in general multihop networks, we believe its fundamental
weakness (when applied to broadcast) lies in the assumption
that the shared key can be kept safe at all nodes. Even if
one node in the network were to be physically compromised
by an intruder to obtain the shared key, they could forge
messages that would pass the authenticity tests at other
nodes. In other words, MiniSec does not satisfy the second
desirable property listed in the previous subsection, which
requires authenticity of broadcast messages to be guaranteed
even if one or more nodes in the network are compromised.
We now summarise a few relevant broadcast authen-
tication schemes (that do not provide secrecy). TinySec
[16] develops mechanisms for symmetric key encryption
of data at the link layer of the communication protocol.
Though TinySec does not mandate how the encryption key
is derived, the expectation is that the key would have a long
lifetime and would be shared by all parties involved in the
communication. Asmentioned earlier, this is problematic for
broadcasts, since receivers are untrusted and can potentially
use the shared key to forge broadcast messages.
The µTESLA [5] protocol overcomes the above problem
by using symmetric key encryption with time varying keys.
The base station constructs a key chain by repeatedly
applying a hash function to an initial random value, and
the root key (the last hash value obtained) is distributed
to each node securely based on a predistributed symmetric
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Figure 1: Key chain encryption of broadcast packets.
key. The chain construction allows nodes to verify that
disclosed keys are authentic. Loose time synchronisation
of the network into regular time intervals is assumed, and
the base station uses a single key from the key chain for
the whole duration of a time interval. The key is disclosed
by the base station at a later time, when nodes can verify
that the key is a valid member of the chain, the message
authentication codes (MACs) of stored broadcast packets are
correct, and that the time delay is such that only the base-
station could have constructed the received packets. Some
of the drawbacks of this scheme are the need for network-
wide (loose) time synchronisation, and the high storage
requirement (of potentially malicious or vacuous packets) at
each node until the authenticity of the packets can be verified
(i.e., after the relevant key is disclosed).
Several schemes have been proposed recently [6–9] for
authentication of broadcast messages in the context of
network programming. A network programming protocol
called Deluge [17], which is included by default in the
TinyOS distribution, allows multihop broadcast dissemina-
tion of new code images on mote-based platforms. In the
absence of authentication, an arbitrary node under Deluge
could broadcast new versions of the software, disseminate
malicious packets, program any number of nodes, and
take over the operation of the entire network. In [6], the
authors of Deluge have extended their scheme to incorporate
authentication of the program image. Their scheme, which
we term SecDeluge, uses a hash chain to verify authenticity
of received packets. The base station sends the code update
in a sequence of packets, each of which includes the hash of
the next packet to be sent. A node receiving the broadcast
packet stores this hash value, and compares it to the value
obtained from hashing the next received packet, thus making
an immediate decision as to whether the packet is authentic
and in sequence. The initial packet is digitally signed so the
initial hash value is authenticated. Sluice [7] is very similar
to SecDeluge except that the hash in the chain is computed
over “pages” rather than packets (where a page typically
carries around 1 KBytes of the program image). Deng et
al. [8] also employ a signed hash scheme, but use a tree
structure that allows packet verification even when packets
arrive out of order. A recent extension called Seluge in [9]
further enhances security in Deluge to address various DoS
attacks.
3. Our Scheme for Secret Broadcasts
In this section we describe and discuss our scheme for
guaranteeing secrecy and authenticity of broadcast messages
in single-hop wireless sensor networks.
3.1. The Procedure. As stated earlier, our scheme relies in the
use of a chain of keys, one key per packet, as depicted in
Figure 1, and described by the steps below.
(1) Key-Chain Generation. The base station (BS) selects
an arbitrary random key kM , and from it generates a key
chain kM , kM−1, . . . , k1, k0, where ki−1 = H(ki) for i =
1, . . . ,M, where H(·) denotes a hash operation (such as
SHA1 or MD5). The length M of the chain can in principle
be arbitrarily large (allowing the chain to be used for
broadcasting as many as M data packets), but practical
designs should bear in mind that the key width (i.e., number
of bits in the key) will limit the number of unique keys
obtained by hashing—successive hashing will ultimately
yield repeated keys in the chain, which should be avoided to
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prevent key reuse. One should also bear in mind that a larger
key chain length M also necessitates larger processing time
and storage space at the base station.
(2) Bootstrapping. The key commitment k0, which we
term the “root key”, needs to be securely conveyed to each
target sensor node. The root key could be programmed
into the sensor nodes prior to deployment (if the key
chain in the previous step is long enough to be used for
the expected lifetime of the node), or one of several key
management schemes [18] can generate dynamic keys for
secure distribution of the root key to each individual node.
The mechanism for root-key distribution is very application
specific, and we outline our approach in Section 5 in the
specific context of a network programming application.
(3) Data Transmission. Once all target sensor nodes have
the root key, the base station creates the first broadcast packet
by concatenating the broadcast data and the successor key k1,
and encrypts the entiremessage with a symmetric encryption
technique using key k0 (see Figure 1). The encryption scheme
must ensure that the encrypted data and encrypted key are
not separable in ciphertext, so that any modification of the
encrypted data also destroys the key. Such message integrity
is guaranteed, for example, by the oﬀset code-book (OCB)
mode [15] of block cipher encryption. The encrypted packet
is then broadcast to all nodes.
(4) Data Reception. A receiver sensor node can decrypt
the message using key k0 (which it already holds) to reveal
the broadcast data as well as the successor key k1. It then tests
whether H(k1) = k0: if so, authenticity and integrity of the
packet’s source and data is assured and the packet is accepted
(see Figure 1). The key k0 is now discarded by the node and
the new key k1 stored in its place.
(5) Iterate. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated for successive
broadcast packets, using key ki in lieu of k0, and ki+1 in lieu of
k1 for i = 1, 2, . . . . Care must be taken that successive packets
are transmitted at a rate which gives nodes suﬃcient time
to extract the data payload and prepare for the next packet.
Once M broadcast packets have been sent, thereby using up
all the M available keys, the base station will have to return
to step (1) to generate a new key chain before it can continue
to send broadcast messages securely.
3.2. Discussion. As described above, the key chain in our
scheme serves the dual purpose of ensuring both secrecy
and authenticity of the broadcast data. The nonforgeability
of the successor key in a received packet derives from the
authenticity of the contents of that packet; this necessitates
the more sophisticated OCB block cipher encryption that
prohibits any part of the broadcast message from being
modified without also modifying the part that holds the
successor key. In spite of its increased complexity, the
advantage of this approach is that the authentication mech-
anism is decoupled from the actual broadcast data itself,
which is particularly useful in scenarios where the broadcast
data is not known before hand. By contrast, the broadcast
authentication schemes proposed in [6–9] compute a hash of
the broadcast data itself, with the initial hash being digitally
signed. While such an approach is acceptable for bulk data
transfer applications (such as network programming), where
the cost of initial secure key exchange can be amortised over
the broadcast, it is not eﬃcient for applications that require
dynamic or short broadcast messages to be sent at regular
or irregular intervals, as may occur in battlefield control and
asset monitoring applications.
Our approach for guaranteeing secrecy (in conjunction
with authenticity) is fundamentally diﬀerent from that of
MiniSec [10]. Though both schemes rely on the use of OCB
to make the payload and nonce nonseparable in cipher text,
the diﬀerence in choice of nonce leads to diﬀerent properties.
MiniSec uses an incrementing counter (the packet number
concatenated with the epoch number) as nonce; this is
simple, allows multihop transmission (provided there is
loose time-synchronisation in the system), and is resilient to
loss. However, it does not preserve message authenticity if a
node is physically compromised yielding the shared key and
counter. Our scheme, by contrast, uses the predecessor key of
the key chain as the nonce. Thismakes authentication slightly
more complex (since the received nonce has to be hashed and
then matched against the stored key), but provides strong
guarantees on message authenticity even if one or more
shared keys are compromised, since a key is never reused.
This additional property of our scheme comes at an expense:
extension to multihop networks requires more complex
solutions, as we outline in [11, 12], and recovery from key
loss also requires a more elaborate mechanism (described
in Section 4). Nevertheless, we believe our approach is
more suited to networks where authenticity is vital even
if secrecy is compromised (e.g., battlefield applications),
whereas MiniSec may better suit deployments in which
secure key storage is guaranteed and key compromise is
therefore not a concern.
Our use of a key chain is most similar to the scheme used
by µTESLA [5]. However, there are some major diﬀerences
since µTESLA is designed for authentication only while
our scheme provides secrecy as well. Our scheme uses the
keys for encrypting data, while µTESLA uses the keys for
computing message authentication codes (MACs) to validate
the data. µTESLA discloses keys some time after the data
has been transmitted (requiring storage of packets), whereas
we send the key to decrypt a packet in the preceding
packet and hence do not require storage of any (potentially
malicious) packets. Lastly, µTESLA uses network-wide loose
time synchronisation, with a single key from the key chain
being used for the whole duration of a time interval, while
our scheme completely eliminates key reuse by changing the
key from packet to packet.
All the proposed broadcast security protocols require
an initial commitment step: the signed first packet or page
in SecDeluge, Sluice, and Seluge commits to a data hash
chain, while the root key in µTESLA and in our scheme
commits to a key chain. Confidentiality of the broadcast data
requires the initial commitment to be transmitted secretly
by the base station to each target node individually. While
this may be computationally expensive (unless the rootkey
is predeployed at all nodes), it is unavoidable if secrecy is
required by the application. We do however note that the
bootstrapping operation can be time overlapped in nodes so
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that for large networks, the time needed by the initialisation
step is limited by communication time requirements rather
than the computational load.
Our scheme does not guarantee authenticity in a multi-
hop network if one or more sensor nodes are compromised.
This is because a compromised transit node in a multihop
network can hold back several packets, extract the keys, and
use them to generate broadcast packets containing malicious
data but valid keys, which would be accepted by receivers
downstream. The extension of our scheme to multihop
networks is beyond the scope of this paper, and is being
addressed by our current research in [11, 12] by use of
multiple one-way key chains.
4. Recovering from Key Losses
A drawback of using the key chain approach above is that a
receiver which misses even one broadcast packet is eﬀectively
excluded from all future broadcast messages: this happens
because the key contained in the missing packet is needed
to decrypt the subsequent packet, which in turn contains the
key to the next packet, and so on. This is not a problem in
applications that perform reliable delivery of broadcast data
(e.g., network programming protocols like Deluge), since
lost packets will be retransmitted as part of the protocol and
lost keys recovered therein. However, there are applications
in which reliable delivery of broadcast data is unnecessary or
prohibitive in cost. For example, consider a group of soldiers
each of whom is equipped with a communication device
receiving broadcast command and control data from a base
station (say a satellite or unmanned aerial vehicle). In such
an application it is infeasible to make the broadcast reliable
since the base station may not know how many receivers are
reachable at any time (some receivers may be inoperational
or out of range), and moreover, it may be unwise to have
receivers reveal their location by transmitting requests for
missing data. In such unreliable broadcast scenarios, the loss
of data in the packet may not be very crucial (for example
the base station can periodically repeat the data), but the loss
of the key contained in the packet is a problem (our scheme
prohibits key reuse for fear of replay attacks). We believe a
scheme that allows a receiver to recover from one or more
lost keys should have the following important properties.
(1) The recovery scheme should balance a receiver’s
ability to recover against the overall vulnerability of
the system. Specifically, it should assist a receiver that
has lost one or a few keys to recover at suﬃciently low
computational cost, but it should limit the ability of
an attacker, who has obtained a previous (old) key, to
decrypt ongoing broadcast messages.
(2) The recovery scheme should scale well to large
numbers of heterogeneous receivers. In other words
receivers should be able to make independent deci-
sions on the eﬀort they want to invest in recovery,
and should also not individually request assistance in
recovery (thereby keeping their location secret).
Eki (Di|ki+1) Eki−m (ki+1|m|H(ki+1|m))
Data field Recovery field
Figure 2: Packet structure augmented to include recovery informa-
tion.
With these requirements in mind, we propose an
extension to our basic key-chain scheme above that allows
recovery from packet loss. Recall that the base station in each
broadcast packet Pi sends data Di and the successor key ki+1,
together encrypted using the current key ki. In addition, we
include in packet Pi the following “recovery information”
(see Figure 2): the next key ki+1, an integer m ≥ 1, and the
hash digest H(ki+1 | m), the entire recovery information
being encrypted with an older key ki−m of the chain. The
idea is of course to allow a node that has missed m previous
broadcast packets to use its old key to jump forward in the
chain and recover the next key to be used.
Algorithm 1 shows formally what a node does upon
receipt of packet Pi. Steps (1)–(4) describe regular packet
processing in the absence of packet loss. If the key-chain
validity check in step (2) fails, the node could have potentially
lost previous broadcast packets, and recovery is attempted in
steps (5)–(13). The node does not know which old key in the
chain is used by the base station for encrypting the recovery
information (since it neither knows the number of packets it
has missed, nor the number m chosen by the base station);
consequently the decryption in step (6) that uses the node’s
stored key may be unsuccessful (i.e., yield nonsense), and
step (7) is needed to verify this by checking the contained
hash. If correct, the successor key ki+1 is authenticated by
hashing itm+1 times (step (9)) to verify (in step (10)) that it
belongs to the key chain, and is then accepted (step (11)),
at which point the node has successfully reattached to the
broadcast session. The packet is discarded if the key does not
authenticate (step (12)) or if the decryption was unsuccessful
(step (13)), which happens when the base station has used a
diﬀerent key for encryption than the key held by the receiving
node, or when the packet is malicious.
The above scheme allows a receiver that has missed m
packets (since its last success) to reattach using the recovery
information contained in the received broadcast packet, only
if the base station uses the same number m in constructing
the recovery information contained in the packet (otherwise
the receiver cannot decrypt the recovery information). An
important question therefore concerns the choice of m
that the base station should make, given absence of any
knowledge of howmany packets each of the (potentially large
number of) receivers has missed (in fact a receiver itself may
not know how many packets it has lost). If m is chosen
as a small constant, a node that has lost j > m packets
can never reattach, since its last key ki− j cannot decrypt the
recovery information in packet Pi or any subsequent packet.
If m is chosen to be a large constant, a node that has lost
j  m packets either has to wait for m − j subsequent
broadcast packets to pass before it can reattach, or spend
much computational eﬀort in trying to decrypt the recovery
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// current key denotes the node’s last correct key
(1) decrypt data field of Pi using current key to obtain data and extracted key
(2) if extracted key hashes to current key // no packets missed
(3) replace current key with extracted key
(4) process data
(5) else // packets may have been missed
(6) decrypt recovery field of Pi using current key to obtain ki+1 | m and recovery hash
(7) if hash of ki+1 | m matches recovery hash
(8) separate ki+1 | m into extracted key and m
(9) hash extracted key m + 1 times and store in trial key
(10) if trial key matches current key
(11) replace current key with extracted key
(12) else discard packet // cannot authenticate key
(13) else discard packet // decryption unsuccessful
(14) end
Algorithm 1: Operations performed by node upon arrival of broadcast packet Pi.
information in packet Pi by trying key ki− j and previous keys
ki− j−1, . . . , ki−m (that it can derive by successive hashing).
No single choice of m is therefore equally eﬀective across
receivers that have missed diﬀerent number of broadcast
packets.
Instead of fixing m, the base station can vary m in a
randomised way from packet to packet. We propose that the
base station choosesm according to a geometric distribution
given by (1 − p)m−1p for a chosen parameter p ∈ (0, 1)
(discussed further below)—the base station can implement
this choice easily by simulating a (biased) coin toss. With
such a choice of m by the base station, a receiver that has
missed k > 1 broadcast packets can successfully decrypt (step
(6)) the recovery information in the received packet if and
only if k = m, which happens with probability (1 − p)m−1p.
This scheme meets the requirements enumerated earlier in
this subsection.
(i) A receiver’s ability to reattach to the broadcast session
falls exponentially with the number of broadcast packets it
has missed since the last time it was attached. This allows
a smooth tradeoﬀ between the network’s resilience to losses
and its vulnerability to attackers: a trusted receiver that
has lost some packets has the opportunity to reattach, but
an attacker has limited time to compromise a key in the
chain and attach it to the network (since old keys become
exponentially less useful with time).
(ii) The parameter p ∈ (0, 1) that determines the range
over which recovery is most eﬀective can be adjusted system-
wide to choose the desired tradeoﬀ point between network
resilience and attack resistance. If P is large, receivers that
have lost one or a few packets can recover quickly, but
the chances of recovery for a node that has missed many
broadcast packets becomes vanishingly small. To take an
example, consider a large P = .5 and a small P = .1.
A node that has missed only 1 packet has a chance of
recovery .5 and .1, respectively, for the large and small P
values above, whereas a node that has lost 10 packets has
probability 0.1% and 3.9%, respectively, for the large and
small P values above, thus showing that small P improves loss
resilience at the expense of increasing the vulnerability of the
system to compromised keys. The operator of the network
can choose an appropriate tradeoﬀ point depending on
application requirements and expected operating conditions.
(iii) The recovery scheme does not penalise receivers
that do not need recovery (beyond the cost of receiving the
recovery field), and receivers which require recovery spend
a computation time linear in the number of missed packets,
as seen in Algorithm 1. A receiver that has the most recently
used key (i.e., has not missed the previous packet) will satisfy
the check-in step (2) and ignore the recovery information,
hence paying no performance penalty. A receiver that has lost
m > 1 packets, or receives a malicious packet, has to perform
the normal decryption and hash check in steps (1)-(2) as well
as the decryption and hash check in steps (6)-(7). Malicious
packets, as well as packets that will not aid in recovery, will
fail the check-in step (7) and be discarded. Packets containing
usable recovery information will have the key validated (step
(8)) in time proportional to the number of lost packets (this
step protects against a sophisticated attacker who uses an old
compromised key).
(iv) Our recovery scheme requires local computation
at the receivers but no radio transmissions; this makes the
scheme scaleable to a large number of receivers, and is also
attractive in scenarios where node location is required to
remain hidden.
We believe the recovery scheme described above is
amenable to implementation in applications where secrecy
and authenticity of broadcast data is important but where
reliable broadcast delivery is infeasible or undesirable.
5. Secrecy for Code Image Broadcasts:
An Implementation
We undertook a first prototype implementation of our
scheme in the context of network programming, namely,
for broadcasting new code images from a base station to
multiple target sensor nodes. Our implementation is based
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on the Deluge network programming protocol [17] that is
distributed with TinyOS. Deluge divides a program image
into pages (typically of size 1104 bytes each), and each
page is transmitted in multiple packets (typically 48). A
page when successfully received is stored in flash memory
by each target sensor node. The lack of security is a well-
known shortcoming in Deluge, and prior schemes such
as SecDeluge [6], Sluice [7], and Seluge [9] mentioned
earlier have extended Deluge to incorporate code image
authentication. None of these proposals however ensure
privacy of the code image broadcast. Our scheme, which we
call PrivCIB (Private Code Image Broadcast), implements
privacy and authentication of Deluge packet transmissions.
We emphasise to the reader that at present our scheme
is limited to single-hop systems where the base station
broadcasts new code images directly to all sensor nodes;
extension to the true multihop “epidemic” dissemination
mechanism of Deluge is deferred to future work. We also
note that the key loss recovery mechanism outlined earlier
in Section 4 above is unnecessary in this application since
Deluge has in-built mechanisms for reliable packet delivery.
Our implementation platform comprised a PC (running
the cygwin environment on Windows XP) acting as a
base station and TelosB motes [19] (commercially available
from Crossbow Technology Inc.) running TinyOS as target
sensor nodes. The base station was implemented in Java
using the BouncyCastle JCE provider [20]. The key size
for symmetric key encryption was chosen as 8 bytes; even
though real deployments would use larger keys for high
security, we chose the key size in our implementation to
be compatible with the RC5 encryption algorithm available
in TinySec [16]. In the first step the base station creates
the key chain: it chooses an initial 8-byte random number
and hashes it using the SHA1 algorithm (with the lowest
8 bytes of the 20-byte result being used as the next key).
The hashing was repeated to create a chain of length 4000,
which is suﬃcient for transfering the program images we
considered. New Java classes were created for the key-
chain establishment, and the Deluge Java toolchain code in
the file DelugeImageInjector.java was modified for the data
transmission operations.
We did not assume that the root key is preshared between
the base station and all sensor nodes; instead a bootstrap
phase was implemented to use public-key cryptography
to convey the root key securely. The base station holds a
public/private key pair, of which the public key is known to
all sensor nodes. Each sensor node also holds a public/private
key pair, and the base-station knows the public key of each
sensor node that is to receive the broadcast data. Note
that the public keys are required only during bootstrapping
to establish initial trust; thereafter shared symmetric keys
are used for data encryption. The bootstrapping phase is
implemented using elliptic-curve public-key cryptographic
operations, which have been show to be feasible for resource-
constrained sensor nodes [21].
A simple way for the base station to deliver the root
key to a particular target sensor node would be for it to
use the target’s public key to encrypt the root key. However,
this is susceptible to capture and replay by an adversary
at a later time, potentially allowing the attacker to revert
the sensor nodes to an earlier code image. To protect
against this, we implement an authenticated Diﬃe-Hellman
exchange first to generate a secure channel, and then to
use that channel for the root key transfer. The base station
initiates the Diﬃe-Hellman exchange by sending a digitally
signed message containing its ephemeral key component,
and the target node responds correspondingly with its own
signed ephemeral key component. The shared ephemeral
key is then generated by each side by combining the
received key component with its own key component. This
shared key allows secure transfer of the root key k0 via
symmetric encryption. The ephemeral nature of the shared
key protects the Diﬃe-Hellman exchange against capture-
and-replay attacks, while authentication via digital signature
prevents an intruder from masquerading as the base station
or as a sensor node, and protects against man-in-the-middle
attacks. We implemented the ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-
Hellman) using primitives from the EccM package [21] from
HarvardUniversity, while the EC-DSA (Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm) was taken from the TinyECC package
[22] developed at North Carolina State University. The entire
procedure is repeated by the base-station for each target node
of the broadcast.
Once the root key has been sent to all nodes, the
actual broadcast data transfer can begin. We used the
RC5 encryption algorithm available from the TinySec [16]
implementation, and incorporated it into Deluge’s NesC file
DelugePageTransferM.nc. The packet structure of Deluge was
modified so that in addition to the 23 bytes of data in the
packet, 8 bytes of key was included corresponding to the
successor key in the key chain. The additional 8 bytes per
packet constitutes an overhead of 384 bytes per page (which
contains 1104 bytes of the program image).
We did not optimise our cryptographic routines for
eﬃciency and performance. Figure 3 compares the mem-
ory usage of our scheme PrivCIB (which performs both
authentication and encryption) to prior schemes SecDeluge,
Sluice, and Seluge (which perform only authentication).
Our scheme requires approximately 19KB more program
memory than Deluge, and approximately 3 KB more RAM
data storage space than Deluge. The ROM and RAM
requirements of our scheme are only slightly higher than
the other schemes, which is an acceptable price to pay for
keeping the broadcast data secret. Our prototype is intended
as a proof of concept; a production implementation would
reduce both the ROM and RAM requirements by removing
duplication in the ECC routines between the EccM and
TinyECC packages, and will be addressed by our future work.
6. Experimental Results
This section profiles our PrivCIB scheme in terms of the time
taken as well as the energy consumed for transfering program
images of various sizes. Our first experiment considers a
single target sensor node. The time taken for the various steps
was measured by incorporating program code to switch the
three LEDs on the motes on or oﬀ at various stages of the
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Figure 4: Transfer time from Base-Station to one node.
algorithm, and timing such changes manually with a stop-
watch. Energy consumption was obtained by integrating the
product of the voltage and current used by the sensor node
during the image transfer, measured using a USB connected
PC oscilloscope manufactured by Cleverscope [23].
Table 1 shows measurements for the transfer of five
program images (four of which are supplied as examples























Program image size (pages)
Deluge
PrivCIB (root key pre-shared)
PrivCIB (root key distributed)
Figure 5: Total energy consumption on target node for image
transfer.
39 pages (recall that each page holds 1104 bytes of data).
The time taken for the image transfer when using Deluge
and when using our PrivCIB scheme (with and without
the root-key distribution phase) is shown in Figure 4,
while the corresponding energy consumption is plotted
in Figure 5. The experiments were repeated several times
and found to give consistent results, so error bars are not
shown.
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Table 1: Program images and transfer time/energy using Deluge
and PrivCIB.
Image Size Deluge PrivCIB
name (pages) Time Energy Time Energy
(sec) (mJ) (sec) (mJ)
Blink 3 10.1 756 19.7 2032
Oscilloscope 9 20.2 2024 49.1 4549
Pong 11 25.6 2506 59.2 5317
TinyECC 23 47.7 4787 116.7 10471
PrivCIB 39 79.7 7940 180.3 17531





Time (msec) Energy (mJ) Time (msec) Energy (mJ)
1 847.1 86.2 2399.7 215.5
2 893.3 93.9 2433.6 217.4
3 838.1 88.4 2433.6 216.9
4 904.0 93.6 2387.7 213.1
5 914.6 94.2 2442.4 217.0
6 914.7 94.5 2431.8 216.6
7 836.3 85.7 2433.6 216.2
8 870.2 88.8 2421.1 215.3
9 1060.5 109.6 2355.6 209.2
10 838.1 86.5 2431.8 216.7
11 804.3 83.5 2376.5 212.1
Average 883.7 91.4 2413.4 215.1
Several observations can be made from these plots:
first, the time and energy requirements under both schemes
grow linearly with program image size, since the operations
performed by the nodes are largely repetitive from page to
page. Second, the time/energy costs of PrivCIB (excluding
the root-key distribution phase) are generally a factor of 2–
2.5 that of Deluge; this represents the price penalty for having
secrecy of the program image broadcast. Third, the dynamic
distribution of the root key (involving the authenticated
Diﬃe-Hellman exchange) in PrivCIB requires a constant
time of approximately 180 seconds which is independent of
the program image size, and this is reflected in the constant
vertical distance between the top curve (that includes root
key distribution) and the middle curve (that assumes a
preshared root key) showing the time/energy requirements
of PrivCIB in the plots.
One would expect the computational cost of PrivCIB
to be substantially higher compared to Deluge (due to the
encryption and hash operations), and the communication
costs to be only marginally higher (approximately 35%,
corresponding to the additional 8 bytes per packet of 23-byte
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Figure 7: Power consumption trace when transfering program
“Pong” using PrivCIB.
payload). Since in general, computation is expected to use
much less energy than communication [24], it is surprising
that the energy requirement of PrivCIB shown in Figure 5
grows at a similar rate to its time requirement shown in
Figure 4. Investigation revealed that this is because the radio
in the sensor node is never put into sleep mode. The high
base load energy consumption rate of the radio even in
idle mode masks the incremental power consumed by the
processor when performing the cryptographic operations
in PrivCIB. Modifying the MAC protocol to incorporate
sophisticated duty-cycling techniques to put the radio in
sleep mode is beyond the scope of this paper; instead, we
resorted to closer analysis of the power traces obtained while
the protocol was in operation in order to identify the regions
where energy consumption increases. We present here traces
obtained during the transfer of the “Pong” image, which is
11 pages long, with and without our secrecy enhancement.
Figure 6 shows the trace of the power consumed by
the target sensor mote when using Deluge for the transfer,
while Figure 7 shows the power consumption when using
our PrivCIB scheme. The voltage and current supplied to
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Table 3: Root-key distribution steps and their time/energy usage.
Task Time (sec) Energy (J)
Creation of ECC keys 53.2 3.25
Verification of digital signature 59.8 5.54
Creation of digitally signed message 35.7 3.58
Sending message to base-station 3.7 0.38
Waiting period 1.3 0.12
Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange 5.5 0.57
Decryption of root-key 9.7 0.79
Sending message to base-station 3.6 0.33
Total 172.5 14.56
the sensor node were sampled at approximately 65KHz
using the Cleverscope USB oscilloscope. To reduce plot size
each data point of the plot is the average of 10 successive
samples. Both figures show an initial region of increased
power consumption (in the range 4–5.5 sec for Deluge
in Figure 6 and 6–7.5 sec for PrivCIB in Figure 7), where
the new program image is advertised/requested as part of
the dissemination protocol. Thereafter, there are exactly
11 regions in either plot that show a marked increase in
power usage: these correspond to the 11 pages that are
transferred as part of the “Pong” image. Each of these 11
regions of activity involves successive reception of 48 packets,
followed by a write operation of the entire page to flash
memory. Table 2 shows the time and energy required for
transfering each of the 11 pages of the “Pong” image under
either scheme, computed from the above traces. As expected,
PrivCIB requires more time for the transfer of each page,
taking 2.41 sec on average compared to 0.88 sec in Deluge.
Correspondingly the average energy consumption per page
with PrivCIB is 215.1mJ compared to 91.4mJ in Deluge.
The increased time and energy requirements in PrivCIB are
attributable to the need for packet decryption (RC5) and key
verification (SHA1) on a per-packet basis, and also the larger
packet size itself due to the need to include the successor
key. Nevertheless, the time and energy cost for incorporating
secrecy and authenticity via our scheme is within a factor 2.5
of standard Deluge without any security.
We also profiled the bootstrap phase that uses the
authenticated Diﬃe-Hellman exchange to distribute the root
key. Table 3 lists the time and energy costs of the various steps
involved. As can be seen, the majority of the time and energy
is spent in creation and verification of the digital signatures.
While earlier proposals like SecDeluge, Sluice, and Seluge
require the first packet of every image transfer to be digitally
signed, our scheme can easily amortise that cost over several
image transfers (or indeed any arbitrary broadcast message
transmissions) by using a suﬃciently long key chain.
Finally, we also tested and profiled our PrivCIB scheme
for upgrading a software image on multiple nodes in a
single-hop topology. Figure 8 compares the time taken for
upgrading 1, 2, 4, and 10 nodes (note that the vertical
scale in this plot starts at 200 seconds), and emphasises
that upgrading each additional node incurs only a small


































Figure 8: Transfer time from Base Station to multiple nodes.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
Critical wireless sensor networks deployed in defence and
resource management applications will require broadcast
data to remain confidential. In this paper we developed a
practical and eﬃcient mechanism that uses low-complexity
symmetric key cryptography with a time-varying key derived
from a key chain in order to guarantee confidentiality,
authenticity, freshness, and semantic security of broadcast
data, while allowing the broadcast data to be dynamic
and incrementally processed. We also proposed a scalable
extension to the scheme that allows receivers to recover
from loss of one or a few keys, with an associated penalty
in system vulnerability to compromised keys as well as
processing and communication costs, that can be adjusted
system-wide. Finally we implemented a prototype of our
mechanism as an add-on to the broadcast-based Deluge
network reprogramming protocol in oﬀ-the-shelf TelosB
motes running TinyOS. Our experiments show that the
time and energy required to broadcast a page of a program
image confidentially and securely to multiple nodes using
our scheme is within a factor of three of that needed by
standard Deluge, with an additional 180 seconds for the
initial bootstrap phase. This cost of the bootstrap can be
amortised over a potentially large number of broadcast
message transfers. We believe this is an acceptable price
to pay for ensuring confidentiality and security of wireless
sensor network broadcasts.
There are several directions for future work: we have
undertaken further work [11, 12] to extend our scheme to
multihop networks where transit nodes may be susceptible
to physical compromise. We have also extended, prototyped,
and analysed our scheme [25] for recovery from lost
keys. Finally, we are prototyping our scheme for broadcast
applications in which the data is dynamic, unlike the network
programming application considered in this paper wherein
the bulk data is known before hand.
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